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Historically, bankruptcy courts have used the Bankruptcy
Code’s avoidance powers—fraudulent conveyances in § 548 and
preferential transfers in § 547—to avoid pre-bankruptcy-petition
transfers.  These avoidance powers were used even when the
transfer in question was a mortgage or tax foreclosure sale.  This
has changed in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.  The BFP Court concluded that
§ 548 could not be used to avoid a mortgage foreclosure sale that
complied with state foreclosure law.  To do so, the Court had to
interpret the operative language in § 548:  “reasonably equivalent
value.”  The Court reasoned that an asset’s fair market value had
no application in the context of a forced sale and ultimately con-
cluded that the price received in the forced sale was a reasonably
equivalent value of the asset.
Following BFP, courts have uniformly applied BFP’s reason-
ing to other forced sales, such as tax foreclosure sales in the con-
text of § 548.  However, courts are split as to whether BFP
should prevent the avoidance of forced sales in the context of
§ 547.  Some courts have not extended BFP to § 547, while other
courts have done so.  This Comment will provide background in-
formation about and examine both sides of the circuit split and
the arguments in favor of each approach.  This Comment will
then endorse the view that BFP’s reasoning applies to prevent
the avoidance of forced sales that comply with state law under
§ 547 preferential transfers.
* J.D. Candidate, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson Law, Class of 2021.  I
would like to thank Tessa Shurr, McKay Lewis, Tori Remmington, and Griffin
Schoenbaum for their invaluable contributions throughout the seemingly unending
process of writing and editing. I would also like to thank John Hykes for his contri-
butions and reassurances.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose an individual has two creditors, each holding an un-
secured debt.  If one of the creditors were to purchase the individ-
ual’s house in a pre-bankruptcy-petition sale, should the sale be
subject to avoidance?  In a new situation, suppose an individual has
two creditors, one of which is secured on the individual’s house, and
the other is unsecured.  In a pre-bankruptcy-petition sale, the se-
cured creditor bids the amount it is owed, but that amount is far less
than the house’s fair market value.  Should this sale be subject to
avoidance?
Bankruptcy courts are split on whether BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corp.1 applies to the Bankruptcy Code § 547,2 and a solution
to this split will answer the above hypothetical questions.3  Whether
1. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
3. Compare Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding,
Inc.), 230 B.R. 334, 336 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (extending BFP’s reasoning to § 547), with
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the solution is to expand BFP to § 547 or not, creditors will be im-
pacted.4  Expanding BFP will, at least in certain situations, limit a
trustee’s ability to recover assets.5  A trustee could no longer re-
cover an asset that had left the estate through certain forced sales
despite the sales satisfying the requirements of § 547.6  If BFP does
not apply to § 547, a creditor could require the trustee to recover an
asset that left the estate through certain forced sales.7  This issue is
certainly limited to a small portion of bankruptcy cases, but the so-
lution to the circuit split could mean the difference between a credi-
tor recovering something or nothing.
This Comment will begin by providing background on the rele-
vant topics:  the bankruptcy code,8 forced sales,9 and pre-BFP
cases.10  This Comment will then analyze the BFP case11 and the
circuit split that has ensued regarding BFP’s application to § 547.12
Finally, this Comment will endorse the position that BFP’s reason-
ing applies to § 547 just as it does to § 548.13
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Bankruptcy Code
1. General
Article One, § Eight of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to create nationwide bankruptcy laws.14  Con-
gress first exercised this power in 1800 with the creation of the
Andrews Northwest Bank Minn., N.A. v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 262 B.R. 299,
306 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (declining to extend BFP’s reasoning to § 547).
4. See infra Section II.G (examining the significance of the circuit split).
5. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Pulcini (In re Pulcini), 261 B.R. 836, 845
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that the trustee had no power to avoid the forced sale,
therefore the estate had fewer assets to satisfy debts).
6. See, e.g., id. (holding that the trustee had no power to avoid the forced
sale).
7. See, e.g., Andrews Northwest Bank Minn., N.A. v. Andrews (In re An-
drews), 262 B.R. 299, 306 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (declining to extend BFP’s reasoning to
§ 547 and avoiding the pre-petition sheriff sale under § 547).
8. See infra Section II.A (providing information on the Bankruptcy Code).
9. See infra Section II.B (providing information on forced sales).
10. See infra Section II.C (examining how cases handled similar situations
prior to the BFP decision).
11. See infra Section II.D (examining the Supreme Court’s reasoning and con-
clusion in BFP).
12. See infra Section II.F (examining the Supreme Court’s reasoning and con-
clusion in BFP).
13. See infra Part III (explaining why BFP should apply to § 547).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE EVOLUTION OF
U.S. BANKRUPTCY LAW: A TIMELINE (2019).
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Bankruptcy Act of 1800.15  Years of development led to the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978,16 commonly known as the Bankruptcy Code
(“the Code”).  Congress has amended the Code several times, but
its foundation remains the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.17  Congress or-
ganized the Code into nine chapters, each chapter addressing a dif-
ferent aspect of bankruptcy law.18  The first three chapters—one,
three, and five—are general provisions.19  There are six forms of
bankruptcy proceedings named after the chapter in which they are
found in the Code.20  This Comment addresses only Chapters 7 and
13.21  Chapter 7 governs the liquidation of a debtor’s bankruptcy
estate,22 and Chapter 13 governs the adjustment of a debtor’s per-
sonal debts.23
15. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 25 (repealed 1803).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.
17. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY
BASICS 5 (2011); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.  The Code is governing law but is
not a comprehensive set of rules. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 5 (2011).  The Federal Rules for Bank-
ruptcy Procedure and Local Rules both provide additional requirements for bank-
ruptcy proceedings. See id; FED. R. BANK. P. 1001–9037.  Additionally, the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure incorporate by reference the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure where they are to apply in the bankruptcy context. FED.
R. BANK. P. 7002.
18. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 103.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2019).
19. Chapter One contains general provisions including definitions, applicabil-
ity, and rules of construction.  11 U.S.C. §§ 101–12.  Chapter Three contains provi-
sions on bankruptcy case administration. Id. §§ 301–66.  Chapter Five includes
information on creditors and claims, debtor’s duties and benefits, and the bank-
ruptcy estate. Id. §§ 501–62.
20. Those chapters are 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15.  Chapter Seven governs the
liquidation of a debtor’s estate. See id. §§ 701–84.  Chapter Nine governs the ad-
justment of a municipality’s debts. See id. §§ 901–46.  Chapter 11 governs the reor-
ganization of business debts.  See id. §§ 1101–74.  Chapter 12 governs a relatively
specific scenario of the adjustment of debts for a family farmer or fisherman. See
id. §§ 1201–32.  Chapter 13 governs the adjustment of debts for an individual with
regular income. See id. §§ 1301–30.  Finally, Chapter 15 governs ancillary bank-
ruptcy cases and cross-border bankruptcy cases. See id. §§ 1501–32.
21. See id. §§ 701–84, 1301–30.  Although this Comment focuses on only con-
sumer bankruptcies, BFP’s reasoning also applies to bankruptcies under other
chapters of the Code. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 103.02.
22. COLLIER supra note 18, ¶ 700.01; Overview of Bankruptcy Chapters, THE
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://bit.ly/3u703gH [https://perma.cc/6AH3-G5E8] (up-
dated May 14, 2015).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 13.  The Code has two countervailing goals:  (1) to give an
unfortunate debtor a “financial fresh start”; and (2) to protect creditors’ claims
against a debtor. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (explaining
the financial fresh start that the Code envisions); KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R45137, BANKRUPTCY BASICS: A PRIMER, 11 (2018) (explaining that the
Code protects creditors’ claims).
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2. Creditors
A creditor is any party that has a claim against the debtor.24
The Code defines a claim as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment . . . disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment . . . disputed,
undisputed, secured, or unsecured.25
The rights of a creditor vary depending on the creditor’s classi-
fication.  The Code creates ten levels of priority for unsecured
claims but does not mention secured claims in its delineation of pri-
ority.26  Secured claims are left out of § 507 because secured credi-
tors hold special rights in the property subject to their lien.27
a. Secured Interests
A creditor with a lien secured on property must be paid out of
the proceeds of the sale of the property before any other creditor
can receive money from such a sale.28  While this is beneficial to the
creditor, a secured claim is secured only to the extent of the collat-
eral’s value and unsecured for any excess over the collateral’s
value.29  At the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding, a judicial
discharge30 extinguishes only the personal liability of the debtor.31
It does not, however, remove the creditor’s lien on the property.32
24. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).  The Code defines “creditor” to include numerous
bodies:
(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or
before the order for relief concerning the debtor;
(B) entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section
348(d), 502(f), 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of this title or
(C) entity that has a community claim.
Id.
25. Id. § 101(5).
26. See id. § 507(a).
27. See id. § 522(c)(2) (explaining that property exempted from the case may
not be used to satisfy any debt except a debt secured by a lien); see also BRUCE A.
MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, A SHORT AND HAPPY GUIDE TO BANK-
RUPTCY 40–41 (2016) (explaining that the benefit of having a secured claim is the
special rights in the property).
28. MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 27, at 40–41.
29. FED. R. BANK. P. 3012 advisory committee’s note.
30. See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing judicial discharge).
31. MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 27, at 41.
32. Id.
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Because liens survive discharge, it is said that “liens and other se-
cured interests survive bankruptcy.”33
b. Unsecured Interests
Intuitively, many bankruptcy estates lack sufficient funds to
satisfy debts owed to every creditor.34  To allocate the remaining
funds in a consistent manner, the Code created a ten-level hierar-
chy that assigns a level of priority to certain categories of claims.35
Only general priority claims are included in this ten-level hierar-
chy.36  General unsecured creditors that do not fall within one of
the priority categories are compensated, pro rata, with any amount
of money that is left after distributing to priority claims pursuant to
the hierarchy.37
3. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Process
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the Chapter 7 trustee38 liquidates
the debtor’s non-exempt assets39 and distributes the proceeds from
the sale to satisfy the debtor’s obligations.40  The debtor receives a
33. Ferry v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297 (1991).
34. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 507.02.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 507.  The first class of claims is domestic support obligations.
Id. § 507(1).  The second class is administrative expenses. Id.  § 507(2).  The third
class is unsecured claims under Section 11 U.S.C. § 502(f). Id. § 507(3).  The
fourth and fifth class related to claims surrounding employees. Id. § 507(4)–(5).
The sixth class relate to claims of farmers and fisherman. Id. § 507(6).  The sev-
enth class relates to claims for deposits in connection with purchases or rentals of
property or services that were not provided. Id. § 507(7).  The eighth class is
claims of governmental units. Id. § 507(8).  The ninth class relates to the debtor’s
deposit of money in an insured depository institution. Id. § 507(9).  The final class
is for claims relating to injury resulting from driving while intoxicated. Id.
§ 507(10).
36. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 507.02.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b). Pro rata distribution requires that each creditor get
compensated “[p]roportionately; according to an exact rate, measure, or interest.”
Pro Rata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  The Code also requires that
creditors of the same class receive equal treatment. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(b),
1322(a)(3).  Therefore, each unsecured creditor must be compensated in the same
amount until a creditor with a smaller claim has been compensated in full. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 1322(a)(3).
38. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 700.02; see infra Section II.A.5 (discussing
trustees’ duties).
39. The debtor may exempt assets in accordance with § 522.  11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d).
40. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 700.04.  This is done in accordance with the
Code’s priority distribution scheme found in § 507 for unsecured creditors. See
supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (explaining the Code’s priority scheme).
Secured creditors are not included in this list because they are ensured payment to
the extent of their secured collateral. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
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judicial discharge of the remaining unpaid debts after the debtor’s
non-exempt assets have been used to pay unsecured creditors.41
Two types of parties may initiate a Chapter 7 bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.42  The first type is a debtor, an individual with an unman-
ageable amount of debt; the second type is a creditor, an entity or
individual seeking repayment of a debt.43  Once a party files a
bankruptcy petition with the court, the Code imposes an automatic
stay, which prevents further collection actions by creditors.44
The debtor must file numerous documents with the court as
part of a bankruptcy petition.45  The court then appoints a trustee
to oversee the proceeding.46  The court sends notice of the bank-
ruptcy to all creditors identified by the debtor in the case47 and
gives the creditors a deadline for filing proofs of claim.48  In accor-
UNITED STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 9–22 (2011); see supra notes 28–33
(discussing secured interests).
41. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 700.05.
42. Id. ¶ 700.02.
43. Id.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).  A U.S. House of Representatives report explains the
significance of the automatic stay:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided
by the bankruptcy laws.  It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors.  It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure
actions.  It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization
plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him
into bankruptcy.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340–44 (1977).
45. Among these documents are form schedules A–J. Bankruptcy Forms, U.
S. COURTS, https://bit.ly/3c9zznG [https://perma.cc/XDY2-DSBX] (last visited Mar.
21, 2021).  The schedules satisfy most of the debtor’s reporting duties outlined in
§ 521. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)–(c), (f), (h).  Schedules A and B define the bank-
ruptcy estate by providing all real property and personal property the debtor owns.
Bankruptcy Forms, U. S. COURTS, https://bit.ly/3c9zznG [https://perma.cc/XDY2-
DSBX] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).  Schedule C allows the debtor to exempt cer-
tain property from the bankruptcy proceedings. Id.  Section 522 outlines the prop-
erty that may be exempted. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).  Schedule D requires the
debtor to list the creditors who hold claims secured by property. Bankruptcy
Forms, U. S. COURTS, https://bit.ly/3c9zznG [https://perma.cc/XDY2-DSBX] (last
visited Mar. 21, 2021).  Schedule E requires the debtor to list priority creditors. Id.
Schedule F requires the debtor to list all general, unsecured creditors. Id.  Sched-
ule G requires the debtor to list all executory contracts and leases. Id.  Schedule H
requires the debtor to list any co-debtors if applicable. Id.  Schedule I requires the
debtor to list his full, gross income. Id.  Finally, Schedule J requires the debtor to
list his monthly expenses. Id.  The debtor must use the provided forms in his peti-
tion. FED. R. BANK. P. 9009.
46. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 700.02; see infra Section II.A.5 (discussing
trustees’ duties).
47. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 700.03.
48. Id.  A proof of claim is what a creditor files to document its assertion that
the debtor owes it money.  1 COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE
¶ 19.04 (2019).
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dance with § 341, the trustee conducts a creditors’ meeting, usually
within 40 to 60 days after the petition is filed, at which time “credi-
tors and the trustee have an opportunity to examine the debtor.”49
Following the creditors’ meeting, the trustee liquidates the estate’s
non-exempt assets and distributes the proceeds to the creditors in
accordance with the distribution scheme in § 507.50  The court will
then give all creditors a deadline by which any creditor may object
to a judicial discharge of the estate’s remaining debt.51  If no credi-
tor objects, the court will discharge the estate’s remaining unpaid
debts.52  After a debtor receives a judicial discharge, the debtor is
no longer personally liable for any unpaid debts that were at issue
in the bankruptcy proceeding, and creditors may no longer pursue
those debts.53
4. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Process
Whereas Chapter 7 involves liquidating assets to satisfy debts,
Chapter 13 requires reorganizing and paying debt through a long-
term payment plan.54  Unlike a Chapter 7 proceeding that can be
initiated by a creditor, the debtor55 must initiate a Chapter 13 pro-
ceeding.56  The debtor must also create and propose a repayment
plan.57  The court will conduct a hearing58 and confirm the debtor’s
repayment plan if it satisfies the requirements of § 1325.59  The plan
49. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 700.03; 11 U.S.C. § 341.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a); see supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Code’s priority distribution scheme).  Alternatively, the trustee might find
there are no assets that can be liquidated.  Gary E. Sullivan, A Fresh Start to Bank-
ruptcy Exemptions, BYU L. REV. 335, 396 (2018).  In this case, the debts are dis-
charged without compensating creditors. Id.
51. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 700.04.  Grounds to prevent a judicial discharge
are found in § 727(a), and a creditor must prove that one of the listed reasons
exists to successfully prevent a discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a); COLLIER, supra
note 18, ¶ 727.01.
52. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 700.05.
53. Id.  This is true of unsecured creditors; however, claims of secured credi-
tors survive a judicial discharge. See supra Section II.A.2.a (explaining secured
creditors rights).
54. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–30.
55. Section 109 limits who may be a debtor in a Chapter 13 proceeding. See
id. §109(e).  Only an individual or an individual and a spouse with regular income
who owes unsecured debt less than $419,275 and secured debts less than $1,184,200
may be a debtor under Chapter 13. Id.  Section 109 also imposes an obligation for
a debtor to undergo debt counseling prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. Id.
§ 109(h).
56. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 1300.15.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1321.
58. Id. § 1324(a).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).  Section 1325 explains the requirements a plan must
satisfy for a court to confirm it and incorporates by reference the requirements of
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must provide the trustee with all or a portion of the debtor’s dispos-
able income, as necessary to complete the plan;60 provide for full
payment of all claims entitled to priority in § 507;61 treat similarly
classified claims in the same manner if the plan classifies claims;62
and provide continuous payments for three or five years.63
Similar to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the automatic stay in a
Chapter 13 proceeding becomes effective upon the debtor’s filing
for bankruptcy.64  The court will also appoint a trustee who super-
vises the proceeding to make sure that the plan accords with § 507
and that the debtor makes timely payments.65  The debtor will re-
ceive a judicial discharge after successfully completing the court-
approved repayment plan.66
5. The Trustee’s Duties and Powers
Both Chapter 7 and 13 require a trustee to ensure compliance
with the bankruptcy rules and provisions.67  A trustee’s duties differ
slightly from a Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 proceeding.68
Congress listed a Chapter 7 trustee’s duties under § 704.69  The
trustee must, among other things, collect and liquidate the debtor’s
non-exempt property,70 ensure that the debtor fulfills his obliga-
tions under the Code,71 investigate the financial affairs of the
debtor,72 apprise parties of the status of the estate,73 and make a
final report and file a final account of the administration of the es-
forming a plan under § 1322.  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1).  When a plan is confirmed, its
provisions “bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such
creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected
to, has accepted or has rejected the plan.” Id. § 1327(a).  In other words, “the
effect of confirmation is sweeping” and binds every party to the terms therein.
MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 27, at 223.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1).
61. Id. §§ 1322(a)(2), 507(a); see supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text
(discussing the Code’s priority distribution scheme).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(3).
63. Id. § 1322(d).  Payment plans are usually over a period of three years, but
the court may extend the plan to five years for cause. Id. § 1322(d)(2)(C).
64. Id. § 362(c).
65. Id. §§ 1302(b)(2)(B)–(C), 1302(b)(5).
66. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 1328.01.
67. MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 27, at 203.
68. The Chapter 13 trustee plays a more active role than the Chapter 7 trus-
tee. Id. at 203–04.
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a).
70. Id. § 704(a)(1).
71. Id. § 704(a)(3).
72. Id. § 704(a)(4).
73. Id. § 704(a)(7).
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tate.74  The trustee must also examine creditors’ proofs of claim75 if
there is a reason to do so76 and object to a judicial discharge if it
would be improper.77
Section 1302 lists a Chapter 13 trustee’s duties and incorpo-
rates many Chapter 7 trustee duties by reference.78  Additionally, a
Chapter 13 trustee must dispose of money received in accordance
with regulations,79 attend any hearing that concerns the value of
property or confirmation or modification of the plan,80 and advise
and assist the debtor in performing under the plan.81
Under Chapter 7 and 13, the trustee has the power to increase
the size of the estate by recovering assets that have improperly left
the estate by avoiding pre-bankruptcy-petition transfers.82
6. Avoidance Provisions
Two Code provisions govern a trustee’s ability to avoid pre-
petition transfers:  (1) § 548, which governs the avoidance of fraud-
ulent transfers,83 and (2) § 547, which governs the avoidance of
preferential transfers.84
Section 548 serves to capture property that the debtor improp-
erly put out of the reach of creditors prior to filing bankruptcy.85
Fraudulent transfer law has long been applied to debtor-creditor
relationships,86 and “[S]ection 548 incorporated the law of fraudu-
lent transfers into the Bankruptcy Code.”87  Section 548, in relevant
part, provides:
74. Id. § 704(a)(9).
75. “A proof of claim is a written statement setting forth a creditor’s claim.”
FED. R. BANK. P. 3001(a).  While § 501(a) permits a creditor to file a proof of
claim, Bankruptcy Rule 3002 requires a creditor to file a proof of claim if it is
seeking a distribution from the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a); FED. R. BANK. P.
3002(c)(a).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5).
77. Id. § 704(a)(6).
78. See id. § 1302(b)(1).  This provision incorporates § 704(a)(2)–(7) and (9)
by reference. See id.
79. Id. § 1302(b)(3).
80. Id. § 1302(b)(2).
81. Id. § 1302(b)(4).
82. The conditions for avoidance are set out in several sections, each of which
govern a different mechanism of avoidance. See id. §§ 544–53, 724(a).  Relevant to
this Comment are the trustee’s powers to avoid preferential transfers and fraudu-
lent transfers. See id. §§ 547, 548.
83. See id. § 548.
84. See id. § 547.
85. In re Brasby, 109 B.R. 113, 121 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
86. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 548.01.
87. Id.  The Code imposes restrictions to narrow the application of fraudulent
transfer law in Bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-3\DIK305.txt unknown Seq: 11  6-MAY-21 15:29
2021] IT’S WORTH WHATEVER SOMEONE PAID FOR IT 777
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer88 . . . of an interest of
the debtor in property . . . that was made . . . on or within 2 years
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor volunta-
rily or involuntarily—
a)(1)(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was
made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a
result of such transfer or obligation.89
Under § 548, a trustee may avoid transfers that a debtor makes
through “actual fraud” or “constructive fraud.”90  Constructive
fraud exists when the asset is not exchanged for a “reasonably
equivalent value” and is transferred within two years prior to the
debtor’s filing the bankruptcy petition.91  The Code, however, does
not define “reasonably equivalent value.”92
Section 547, the preference provision, is similar to § 548 in that
it gives a trustee the power to avoid pre-petition transfers, but there
are some important differences between the sections.93  First, the
goal of § 547 is to prevent a transfer that benefits one creditor at
the expense of other creditors.94  Section 547, in relevant part,
provides:
(b) the trustee may . . . avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property—
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4)(A) made on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition . . .; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if—
88. “Transfer” is defined as “the creation of a lien; the retention of title as a
security interest; the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption; or each mode,
direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of
or parting with property; or an interest in property.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(54).
89. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I).
90. Id. § 548(a)(1)(A)–(B).  Actual fraud is when a transfer is made with ac-
tual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a past or future creditor.  S. Rep. No. 95-
989, at 89 (1978).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).
92. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546–47 (1994) (respond-
ing to Justice Souter’s dissent, the majority explained that the statute was
ambiguous).
93. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 548.01.
94. Microage Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. & Elecs. USA, Inc. (In re MICROAGE
Corp.), 288 B.R. 855, 860 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003).
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(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.95
Next, § 547 looks retroactively at the 90 days prior to filing a
bankruptcy petition, instead of at the 2-year period used in § 548.96
Third, and most importantly, the standard for when a trustee may
avoid a pre-petition transfer is different.97  Section 548 asks
whether the transfer was in exchange for a “reasonably equivalent
value” of the asset.98  Section 547, however, asks whether the credi-
tor received more than the creditor would have received, if no ad-
vance payment were made and the case had been filed under
Chapter 7.99
B. Forced Sales
A trustee may attempt to avoid two types of forced sales:  a
mortgage foreclosure sale and a tax foreclosure sale.100
A mortgage foreclosure sale occurs when a person fails to
make timely payments on his or her mortgage, and the mortgagee
forces the sale of the property to recover the money it loaned to the
debtor.101  Generally, state foreclosure procedure provides safe-
guards to protect a debtor.102
A tax foreclosure sale occurs when a person fails to pay some
form of taxes for a long enough period of time to require such ac-
tion by the taxing entity.103  For example, a municipality may force
95. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
96. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A), with 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).  If, how-
ever, the creditor is an insider, § 547 extends the look-back window to one year
prior to the bankruptcy petition.  11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B).
97. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 548.01.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5).  The transfer will be subject to avoidance if the
creditor received more in the advance payment than it would have under a Chap-
ter 7 proceeding. Id.
100. See Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding, Inc.),
230 B.R. 334, 336 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (involving a mortgage foreclosure sale); see also
RL Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Coffman (In re RL Mgmt. Grp., LLC), 2014 Bankr.
LEXIS 206, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2014) (involving a tax foreclosure sale).
101. Bill Fay, Foreclosures, DEBT.ORG, https://bit.ly/32vRCOK [https://
perma.cc/CA44-5BXB] (May 18, 2020).
102. Talbot v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re Talbot), 254 B.R. 63, 68
(Bankr. D. Conn. 2000).  These protections sometimes include competitive bid-
ding. Id.
103. Oddette Williamson & Jillian McLauglin, Tax Lien Sales Put Low-In-
come Seniors and the Disabled at Risk of Foreclosure, 34 AMERICAN BAR ASS’N 7
(2012).
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the sale of a home to recover unpaid property taxes.104  Tax sales
sometimes require competitive bidding, which is similar to the pro-
cedural safeguards found within mortgage foreclosure sale
procedures.105
State property law governs both mortgage foreclosures and tax
sales, and each state has different policies and procedures for
forced sales.106  This Comment will later discuss the interplay be-
tween federal bankruptcy law and state foreclosure law.107
C. Pre-BFP Cases
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp.,108 federal bankruptcy courts routinely applied § 547 to avoid
state mortgage and tax foreclosures if the sale satisfied the elements
of § 547.109  The court’s holding in In Re Wheeler110 typifies the pre-
BFP cases that applied § 547 to avoid mortgage foreclosure sales:
FNMA is receiving property with a market value several thou-
sand dollars in excess of their claim.  Thus, it becomes evident
that the foreclosure sale did enable FNMA to receive more than
they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.  The court deter-
mines that this foreclosure sale was a preferential transfer under
§547(b).111
D. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Code—specifically, § 548 fraudu-
104. Id.
105. Smith v. SIPI, LLC (In re Smith), 811 F.3d 228, 234 (7th Cir. 2016) (ex-
plaining that there are interest rate bidding practices that are not similar to the
competitive price bidding practices seen in mortgage foreclosure sales).
106. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 540 (1994).
107. See infra notes 140–43, 158 and accompanying text (discussing federalism
concerns).
108. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
109. See In re Smith, 21 B.R. 345, 352 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (finding the
mortgage foreclosure sale constituted a preference under § 547); In re Park North
Partners, Ltd., 80 B.R. 551, 555 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (remanding the case for a determi-
nation of whether the creditor received more than he would have under a Chapter
7 bankruptcy and concluding that the mortgage foreclosure sale would be subject
to avoidance if the elements of § 547 were satisfied); In re Winters, 119 B.R. 283,
285 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (finding the foreclosure sale satisfied the elements of § 547
when comparing the sale price to the fair market value of the asset); Villarreal v.
Showalter (In re Villarreal), 413 B.R. 633, 642 (S.D. Tex 2009) (finding the transfer
of the property in the foreclosure sale satisfied each element of § 547 and accord-
ingly avoided the foreclosure sale).
110. In re Wheeler, 34 B.R. 818 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
111. Id. at 821.
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lent transfers—could be used to avoid a mortgage foreclosure sale
that complied with state foreclosure law.112  The Court ultimately
held that the Code could not avoid such a transfer because a “‘rea-
sonably equivalent value,’ for foreclosed property, is the sale price
in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as the requirements
of the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with.”113
In BFP, a partnership purchased a home in California, subject
to a deed of trust,114 with Imperial Savings Association (“Impe-
rial”).115  The partnership then granted a second deed of trust to the
owners of the home as security for a promissory note.116  The part-
nership failed to make payments under the first deed of trust, and
Imperial entered a notice of default.117  After some delays,118 fore-
closure proceedings concluded with a sale on July 12, 1989, when
Paul Osborne, a third party, purchased the home for $433,000.119
In October 1989, the partnership filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and
petitioned the bankruptcy court to set aside the conveyance to Os-
borne as a fraudulent transfer under § 548.120
The court analyzed whether the amount received at the fore-
closure sale constituted a “reasonably equivalent value” of the
home.121  This inquiry turned on Congress’s intent by using the
phrase “reasonably equivalent value” and whether that intent was
ambiguous.122  Initially, the Supreme Court looked at the three ex-
isting approaches used to determine reasonably equivalent value.123
112. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 533.
113. Id. at 545.
114. A deed of trust is “[a] deed conveying title to real property to a trustee
as security until the grantor repays a loan.” Deed of Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (11th ed. 2019).
115. BFP, 511 U.S. at 533.
116. Id.
117. Id.  Under many states’ laws, prior to foreclosing on a property, a loaning
entity is required to file a notice of default which informs the borrower of their
failure to pay.  Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws
of a Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1899, 1920–21 (2013).
118. The foreclosure proceedings were temporarily delayed when the partner-
ship filed for voluntary bankruptcy. BFP, 511 U.S. at 533.  Thereafter, the partner-
ship’s bankruptcy petition was dismissed, and the foreclosure sale commenced. Id.
at 534.
119. Id. at 533–34.
120. Id. at 534.  Sections 547 and 548 are applicable to bankruptcies filed
under every section of the Code. COLLIER, supra note 18, ¶ 103.02.
121. BFP, 511 U.S. at 534 (explaining that the house sold, at auction, for
$433,000, but “Petitioner alleged that the home was actually worth over $725,000
at the time of the sale to Osborne”).
122. Id. at 535.  Specifically, the Court interpreted what Congress intended as
the benchmark against which a court could judge the value of a forced sale asset
and, thus, whether the sale achieved a reasonably equivalent value. See id.
123. See id.
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The first approach, the Fifth Circuit’s Durrett124 view, used an
asset’s fair market value as the benchmark against which a court
could judge whether a transfer was for a reasonably equivalent
value.125  The Durrett view effectively created a federal minimum
sale price that state foreclosure sales would have to meet.126  If not
met, the sale would be subject to avoidance.127
The second approach, the Seventh Circuit’s all facts and cir-
cumstances approach, sought a middle ground between the fair
market value and the sale price of the foreclosure sale itself as the
benchmark for reasonably equivalent value.128  Under normal cir-
cumstances, this method would incorporate a rebuttable presump-
tion of reasonably equivalent value when the sale in question was a
state foreclosure sale.129  This standard implicitly set a reasonable
forced sale price as the standard against which to judge reasonably
equivalent value.130
The final approach, the Ninth Circuit’s, equated the price re-
ceived at a non-collusive, regularly conducted real estate foreclo-
sure sale with a reasonably equivalent value.131  The benchmark for
reasonably equivalent value was the sale price itself.132
The Supreme Court reasoned that the concept of fair market
value is inapplicable to a forced sale scenario, stating that “‘fair
market value’ presumes market conditions that, by definition, sim-
ply do not obtain in the context of a forced sale.”133  The Court
noted that because the limitations inherent in a forced sale, prop-
erty sold in such a manner was “worth less” than its fair market
counterpart.134  Further, the Court explained that Congress could
have used the phrase “‘received less than fair market value in ex-
change for such transfer or obligation’” if it believed that fair mar-
ket value were the appropriate benchmark.135  However, Congress
124. Durrett v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
125. See Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203–04.
126. Id.
127. See e.g., BFP, 511 U.S. at 535 (explaining that the Durrett court postu-
lated a minimum sale price of 70 percent of the home’s fair market value to escape
the trustee’s avoidance powers under § 548).
128. See In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
129. See id.
130. See id. (explaining that a court may begin its analysis with the fair market
value but acknowledged that forced sales create unique market environments and
concluding that bankruptcy courts are to consider “the fair market value as af-
fected by the fact of foreclosure”).
131. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 535.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 538.
134. Id. at 539.
135. Id. at 537.
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intentionally used the phrase “reasonably equivalent value,” which
suggested Congress did not intend to use fair market value as a
benchmark.136  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Durrett ap-
proach, which used fair market value.137
The Court was then left with two benchmarks against which it
could judge “reasonably equivalent value”:  first, the Ninth Circuit’s
foreclosure-sale price itself approach and second, the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s reasonable foreclosure sale price approach.138  The Court re-
jected the reasonable foreclosure sale price approach after
discussing the federalism concerns posed by the Code’s interaction
with state foreclosure law.139
In rejecting this approach, the Court cited the co-existence of
fraudulent transfer law and state foreclosure law dating back 400
years to old English law.140  The Court explained that the mere in-
adequacy of a sale price had never been a basis for setting aside a
forced sale in the context of federal fraudulent transfer law.141  The
Court conceded that federal law trumps state law when a conflict
exists.142  However, absent clear congressional intent to disrupt the
balance that had been forged over hundreds of years, the Court
would not allow the Federal Bankruptcy Code to impede state fore-
closure law.143
The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s forced sale price
itself is the correct benchmark against which to evaluate whether a
foreclosure sale commanded a “reasonably equivalent value.”144  A
bankruptcy trustee cannot avoid a state mortgage foreclosure sale
136. Id. (explaining that § 548 is the only instance in the Code that Congress
used this phrase).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 538, 540.
139. See id. at 540–45.
140. See id. at 540–41.
141. BFP, 511 U.S. at 542 (noting that inadequate price may, however, be a
basis for avoidance under some states’ foreclosure laws).
142. Id. at 546 (agreeing with the dissent “that where the ‘meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code’s text is itself clear,’ its operation is unimpeded by contrary state
law or prior practice”) (internal citations omitted).
143. Id. at 540, 543.  The dissent explained that the majority was requiring
something more than clear intent, but the majority reasoned that because the lan-
guage is ambiguous, Congress’s intent could not be clear. Id. at 551 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 540, 543 (majority opinion).  The decision to view the phrase as
ambiguous was influenced by the important state interest of ensuring stability of
titles to real property after foreclosure sales. Id. at 542.
144. Id. at 545.  Implicit in the Supreme Court’s position is circular reasoning
that the price received in a foreclosure sale is a reasonably equivalent value of the
asset, merely because it was the price received. See id. at 545, 549.  This ensured
federal law would not encroach on state law by preventing the Bankruptcy Code
from avoiding any validly conducted state foreclosure sale. See id. at 540–43.
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that complies with state law—regardless of the sale price.145  The
Court expressly limited its holding to mortgage foreclosures and
noted that the result may be different in a case involving other
types of forced sales, such as tax foreclosure sales.146
The dissent believed that the benchmark for reasonably
equivalent value advocated by the majority was implausible.147
However, the dissent did not offer an alternative approach.148
Regarding the federalism issue, the dissent explained that the
Code should trump state law.149  The dissent explained that
“[a]lthough this formulation [of § 548] makes no pretense to mathe-
matical precision, an ordinary speaker of English would have no
difficulty grasping its basic thrust.”150  On this basis, the dissent con-
cluded that the plain meaning of the statute was clear.151  When the
plain meaning of a statute is clear, the state regulation must yield to
the extent it actually conflicts with federal law.152  The dissent con-
cluded that the language of § 548 granted to the bankruptcy trustee
the power to avoid foreclosure sales that, despite complying with
state law, failed to exchange the asset for a “reasonably equivalent
value.”153
E. Expansion of BFP Within § 548
Despite the Court’s disclaimer that its BFP decision was lim-
ited to § 548 mortgage foreclosure sales, bankruptcy courts have
had a uniform approach in applying BFP’s reasoning to § 548 tax
sales.154  Courts have determined that BFP’s reasoning should ap-
145. Id.
146. Id. at n.3.
147. Id. at 551 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 551 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 547 (majority
opinion) (“[O]ne searches Justice Souter’s opinion in vain for any alternative re-
sponses to the question of the transferred property’s worth.”).
149. Id. at 566–67 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 552.
151. See id.  The dissent also expressed dissastisfaction with the majority’s po-
sition that, due to the importance of the state interest in maintaining good titles to
real property, Congress must either expressly override the state interest or not
override at all. Id.
152. Id. at 567 (explaining that this is not changed even when the federal law
does not use language that pre-empts state law).
153. Id. at 569–70.
154. See Tracht Gut, LLC v. Cnty. of L.A. (In re Tracht Gut, LLC), 503 B.R.
804, 815–17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (explaining how courts have approached BFP’s
application to pre-petition tax foreclosure sales in the context of § 548 avoidance).
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ply where a state’s foreclosure sale requires competitive bidding
and should not apply where there is no competitive bidding.155
F. The Circuit Split
As previously noted, prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
BFP, federal bankruptcy courts uniformly applied § 547 to avoid
state foreclosure sales.156  Following BFP, bankruptcy courts have
split on the question of whether BFP’s reasoning should extend to
§ 547 preferences.157  The courts that have extended BFP to § 547
have done so mainly for one of two reasons.  First, some courts
have reasoned that BFP’s federalism policy considerations are as
applicable to § 547 as § 548.158  These courts believe that the same
federalism concerns that shaped the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
BFP are present in and guide a § 547 preference analysis.159
155. Compare Kojima v. Grandote Int’l Ltd. Liab. Co. (In re Grandote Coun-
try Club Co.), 252 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying the Colorado Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Act, the court extended BFP to a tax sale that required
competitive bidding), with Sherman v. Rose (In re Sherman), 223 B.R. 555, 558–59
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (applying Wyoming tax sale law, the court declined to ex-
tend BFP to tax sale that did not require competitive bidding); see also Smith v.
SIPI, LLC (In re Smith), 811 F.3d 228, 234 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that BFP did
not apply because Illinois tax sales did not require competitive bidding).
156. See infra Section II.B (explaining how courts handled cases which in-
volved using § 547 to avoid mortgage or tax foreclosure sales prior to BFP).
157. Compare Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding,
Inc.), 230 B.R. 334, 336 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (extending BFP’s reasoning to § 547), with
Andrews Nw. Bank Minn., N.A. v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 262 B.R. 299, 306
(M.D. Pa. 2001) (declining to extend BFP’s reasoning to § 547). See also Andrew
Butler, Vexatious Valuations: The Impropriety of Importing BFP to Preference Ac-
tions, 27 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, 4–6 (2018) (explaining the arguments of each
side of the circuit split regarding § 547).
158. See RL Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Coffman (In re RL Mgmt. Grp., LLC),
No. 13-51849, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 206, at *16–18 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2014) (ex-
plaining the applicability of state interests articulated in BFP to a § 547 analysis);
Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding, Inc.), 230 B.R. 334,
341 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (explaining that “[t]o hold this foreclosure to be a preferential
transfer would create the same problems with state real property title records that
would have been created by classifying the transaction as a fraudulent transfer”).
159. See RL Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Coffman (In re RL Mgmt. Grp., LLC),
No. 13-51849, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 206, at *16–18 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2014) (ex-
plaining the applicability of state interests articulated in BFP to a § 547 analysis);
Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding, Inc.), 230 B.R. 334,
341 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (explaining that “[t]o hold this foreclosure to be a preferential
transfer would create the same problems with state real property title records that
would have been created by classifying the transaction as a fraudulent transfer”).
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Second, other courts that have extended BFP have done so by
extending BFP’s presumption that the price received at a forced
sale reflects the value of the property.160  One court reasoned:
It compels the conclusion that a pre-petition transfer of a
debtor’s interest in real property to a lien creditor who purchases
the property at a regularly-conducted, non-collusive sheriff’s sale
and who then sells the property to a third party for an amount
greater than the amount of its lien is not avoidable in accordance
with § 547(b) as a preference.  In particular, the lien creditor
does not “receive more” for purposes of § 547(b)(5) than it
would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation.161
Some bankruptcy courts, however, have not extended BFP’s
reasoning to § 547.162  These courts have not done so for one of two
main reasons.  First, BFP interpreted the phrase “reasonably
equivalent value,” which does not appear in § 547.163  Because
§ 547 uses different language, courts have concluded that § 548’s
reasoning has no place in a § 547 analysis.164  Second, though judi-
cial intervention was necessary to interpret the ambiguous § 548
160. See Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre), 562 B.R. 890, 893–94 (W.D.
Pa. 2017) (adopting the reasoning of Pulcini and Rocco, which applied BFP’s ratio-
nale of the value of an asset to § 547); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Rocco (In re
Rocco), 319 B.R. 411, 416 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (affirming the reasoning used in Pulcini
and explaining that even under an Andrews’s fair market value analysis the result
in the case would not differ); see also Rambo v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. (In
re Rambo), 297 B.R. 418, 429–31 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing the conclusions of
cases based on the benchmark against which the court valued the asset).
161. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Pulcini (In re Pulcini), 261 B.R. 836, 844
(W.D. Pa. 2001); see JP Morgan, 319 B.R. at 416 (affirming the reasoning used in
Pulcini).
162. See Hackler v. Arianna Holdings Co., LLC (In re Hackler), 571 B.R. 662,
668 (D.N.J. 2017) (holding that the trustee could avoid a pre-petition tax foreclo-
sure sale); Berley Assocs. v. Eckert (In re Berley Assocs.), 492 B.R. 433, 443
(D.N.J. 2013) (holding the trustee could avoid a pre-petition tax foreclosure sale
and citing Andrews with approval); Nw. Bank Minn., N.A. v. Andrews (In re An-
drews), 262 B.R. 299, 306 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (declining to extend BFP’s reasoning to
§ 547).
163. See Whittle Dev., Inc. v. Branch Banking Trust Co. (In re Whittle Dev.,
Inc.), 463 B.R. 796, 802 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (explaining that BFP’s section
548(a)(2)(A) analysis “concerned what, as a matter of law, ‘reasonably equivalent
value’ meant.  No such legal issue presents itself in avoidance actions under section
547(b)(5)(A) since the operative question is simply whether the creditor did in fact
receive more than it would have had the transfer not occurred”) (internal citations
omitted); see also Andrew Butler, Vexatious Valuations: The Impropriety of Im-
porting BFP to Preference Actions, 27 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, 4–6 (2018) (ex-
plaining that some courts view BFP as having nothing to offer in the context of
§ 547).
164. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (explaining why BFP is inap-
plicable in light of different statutory language).
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phrase “reasonably equivalent value,” there is no need for such in-
terpretation in § 547.165  Unlike § 548’s “reasonably equivalent
value,” § 547’s phrase “received more than under a Chapter 7 liqui-
dation” is mathematically certain.166  Accordingly, judicial interpre-
tation is unwarranted, and § 547 may be used to avoid all transfers
that satisfy its elements—even foreclosures that comply with state
law.167
G. Significance
The resolution of this circuit split is important to the creditor-
debtor relationship.  Creditors will be impacted directly.  Applying
BFP’s reasoning to § 547 would negatively impact creditors.  A
debtor could transfer assets out of its estate, even in violation of
§ 547, and the trustee would not be able to avoid the sale if it com-
plied with state foreclosure laws.168  If the transfer were a foreclo-
sure sale conducted in accordance with state law, the debtor’s estate
would have a smaller pool of assets to satisfy all of its creditors’
debts.169  Accordingly, each creditor would receive less from the es-
tate because of the transfer that violated § 547.170
If BFP is not applied to § 547 sales, unsecured creditors may
require that the trustee avoid validly conducted state foreclosure
165. See Villarreal v. Showalter (In re Villarreal), 413 B.R. 633, 642 (S.D. Tex.
2009) (explaining that the BFP Court used policy to reason through § 548, but
“[s]ection 547 does not lend itself to such an interpretation and th[is] Court may
not ignore Congressional language in favor of judicial policy”); Andrews, 262 B.R.
306 (asking “[w]hy not apply simple mathematics to this issue?”).  The court ex-
plained that “[Congress] chose to use the term ‘more.’  This simple mathematical
approach does not ignore the windfall to creditors . . . .” Id.  The court ultimately
held that avoidance is proper under § 547 when the foreclosure sale price is sub-
stantially less than the fair market value of the property. Id.
166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining that the statutory
language is “mathematically certain”); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S.
531, 552 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that “an ordinary speaker of
English would have no difficulty grasping its basic thrust:  the bankruptcy court
must compare the price received by the insolvent debtor and the worth of the item
when sold and set aside the transfer if the former was substantially ‘less than’ the
latter”) (internal citations omitted).
167. See Rambo v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. (In re Rambo), 297 B.R.
418, 427 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (explaining that the proper analysis of BFP’s application
to § 547 begins with the language of the statute and not the policies that would
support it).
168. Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding, Inc.), 230
B.R. 334, 340–41 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that the court had no power to avoid a
foreclosure sale that complied with state law).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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sales that satisfy the requirements of § 547.171  The estate would
have more assets, so each creditor would receive a greater payout
as a result.172
III. ANALYSIS
A. BFP’s Reasoning Should Apply to § 547
The courts that have declined to extend BFP have done so pri-
marily based on an analysis of the statutory language—not pol-
icy.173  Some courts have reasoned that, because the statutory
language is different, BFP is necessarily inapplicable to a § 547
analysis.174  Other courts have acknowledged the legitimacy of
BFP’s rationales but have declined to extend BFP because the
phrase “received more” is sufficiently clear and does not require
judicial interpretation.175
Some courts have extended BFP.176  Of these courts, some
have done so on faulty reasoning.  These courts have extended BFP
primarily because the federalism policy considerations that drove
the § 548 analysis are just as applicable to § 547.177  A smaller num-
ber of courts, however, have extended BFP, more correctly, be-
cause they have determined that BFP’s discussion of how to value
property is equally applicable to § 547.178
171. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Pulcini (In re Pulcini), 261 B.R. 836, 844
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that the trustee could not avoid the sheriff’s sale in
question).
172. Id.
173. Rambo v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. (In re Rambo), 297 B.R. 418,
427–28 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (explaining that other courts have reached a determination
without a discussion of the statutory predicate).
174. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (explaining why BFP is inap-
plicable in light of different statutory language).
175. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (explaining that judicial
interpretation is not necessary where Congressional intent is clear).
176. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text (explaining that certain
courts have extended BFP).
177. See RL Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Coffman (In re RL Mgmt. Grp., LLC),
No. 13-51849, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 206, at *16–18 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2014) (ex-
plaining the applicability of state interests articulated in BFP to a § 547 analysis);
Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding, Inc.), 230 B.R. 334,
340–41 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (explaining that BFP’s principal rationale is applicable to
§ 547).
178. See Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre), 562 B.R. 890, 893–94 (W.D.
Pa. 2017) (adopting the reasoning of Pulcini and Rocco, which applied BFP’s ratio-
nale of the value of an asset to § 547); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Pulcini (In re
Pulcini), 261 B.R. 836, 844 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining that fair market value is
not the correct measuring stick in the context of a forced sale, and that “the lien
creditor does not ‘receive more’ for purposes of § 547(b)(5) than it would receive
in a chapter 7 liquidation”).
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1. Declined to Extend
The courts that have declined to extend BFP to § 547 have nar-
rowly approached the issue and have erred in doing so. BFP’s rea-
soning was couched in a case that determined the application of
§ 548, but it should not be limited to that scenario.179  Section 548
asks whether the asset was transferred in exchange for a “reasona-
bly equivalent value.”180  To answer that question, a court must de-
termine the value of the asset.181  The Supreme Court grappled with
this very question when it considered against what benchmark “rea-
sonably equivalent value” would be judged.182  The answer to this
question is just as applicable to § 547 as it is to § 548.183  Without
understanding how to value an asset, how can a court determine
whether a creditor had received more?184
The BFP Court clearly reasoned that fair market value was not
the proper measuring stick for an asset’s value.185  Instead, the
Court determined that the mortgage foreclosure sale price itself
was the only proper measure for the asset’s value.186
The courts that have not extended BFP have ignored BFP’s
central reasoning and have returned to using the asset’s fair market
value as the benchmark.”187  These courts missed the pivotal rea-
179. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 535, 547 (1994) (ad-
dressing § 548); Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding,
Inc.), 230 B.R. 334, 336 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (extending BFP’s reasoning to § 547).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
181. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 547 (examining the deficiency in the dissent’s posi-
tion relating to the question of valuation).  The majority explained this deficiency:
[T]he dissent simply reiterates the “single meaning” of “reasonably
equivalent value” (with which we entirely agree):  “A court should dis-
cern the ‘value’ of the property transferred and determine whether the
price paid was, under the circumstances, ‘less than reasonable.’’’  Well
and good.  But what is the “value”?  The dissent has no response.
(internal citations omitted). Id.
182. Id. (explaining that the majority “considered three . . . possible answers
to the question—fair market value, reasonable forced-sale price, and the foreclo-
sure-sale price itself—and have settled on the last”) (internal citations omitted).
183. See e.g., Veltre, 562 B.R. at 893–94 (adopting the reasoning of Pulcini and
Rocco, which applied BFP’s rationale of how to determine the value of an asset to
§ 547).
184. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 547 (explaining that the dissent’s position does not
answer the crucial question—”what is the ‘value’?”).
185. Id. at 537–38.
186. Id. at 549 (explaining that, in the context of forced sales, the fair market
value is not useful and that “the only legitimate evidence of the property’s value at
the time it is sold is the foreclosure-sale price itself”).
187. See Hackler v. Arianna Holdings Co., LLC (In re Hackler), 571 B.R. 662,
668 (D.N.J. 2017) (using an expert’s valuation of the property to determine that
the creditor “received more” than it would have under a Chapter 7 proceeding);
Berley Assocs. v. Eckert (In re Berley Assocs.), 492 B.R. 433, 443 (D.N.J. 2013)
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soning BFP supplied to answer the inherent comparative value
question within § 548 and § 547.188
2. What Is an Asset Worth?
BFP’s reasoning should extend to § 547 preference actions.
However, some courts have arrived at this conclusion on faulty rea-
soning.  It is not simply that the same federalism considerations
arise in each context that justifies expanding BFP.189  The Supreme
Court’s explanation of how to value property is what drives this
conclusion.190  Under the dictates of BFP, when a court is analyzing
whether a creditor received “more” than it would have in a Chapter
7 liquidation, the court cannot consider the fair market value of the
asset.191  Instead, the court must look to the sale price actually re-
ceived in the forced sale when assessing the “value” of the asset.192
The effect of incorporating BFP’s reasoning to § 547 depends
on the type of creditor.  In the instance of a secured creditor, the
creditor can avoid any preference action under § 547 if it bids only
the amount of the lien it holds against the property.193  If it does not
bid more than its lien, a creditor can never “receive more” than it
would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation.194  The property’s value is
the price received in a forced sale.195  The creditor would always
(explaining the “windfall” the creditor received and citing Andrews with approval);
Northwest Bank Minn., N.A. v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 262 B.R. 299, 306 (M.D.
Pa. 2001) (explaining that a pre-petition forced sale can be avoided under § 547 if
the “claim of the foreclosing party is substantially less than the fair market value of
the property”).
188. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 547–48.
189. See, e.g., RL Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Coffman (In re RL Mgmt. Grp.,
LLC), No. 13-51849, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 206, 16–18 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2014)
(concluding that BFP is applicable to § 547 based on the applicability of the need
to protect state interests articulated in BFP).
190. BFP, 511 U.S. at 547–48.
191. Id. at 535–39.  “[P]roperty that must be sold within those strictures is
simply worth less.” Id. at 539. See Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re
FIBSA Forwarding, Inc.), 230 B.R. 334, 340–41 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (explaining that
an asset’s fair market value could not be used to determine whether a transfer was
made in exchange for a reasonably equivalent value).
192. See supra notes 182–88 and accompanying text (explaining that price re-
ceived—not the fair market value—drives the analysis).
193. Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre) 562 B.R. 890, 894 (W.D. Pa.
2017) (adopting the reasoning of Pulcini and Rocco, which applied BFP’s rationale
of valuing an asset to § 547, and determining that the creditor could not receive
more than in a Chapter 7 proceeding).
194. Id.
195. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 548 (explaining that “the only legitimate evidence
of the property’s value at the time it is sold is the foreclosure-sale price itself”).
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receive exactly the amount it would have received under a Chapter
7, which is the amount of its lien.196
If, however, the secured creditor bids above the amount of the
lien it holds against the property, the transfer would be subject to
avoidance as a preferential transfer.197  Again, in a Chapter 7 liqui-
dation, the creditor would receive only the amount of its lien.198  If
the creditor pays an amount greater than its lien, then the value of
the asset is greater than the creditor’s lien.199  Because the creditor
received an asset that is “worth more” than its lien, the transfer
would be subject to avoidance.200
In the unlikely case of an unsecured creditor purchasing a
debtor’s asset in a forced sale, the opposite result would yield.  The
transfer would likely always be subject to avoidance as a prefer-
ence, even if the creditor were to bid the amount of debt it is owed.
In accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured creditors are
paid on a pro rata201 basis.202  A creditor that receives its full debt
amount would almost always receive more than it would have
under a Chapter 7 if there are no other assets in the estate.203
196. See Veltre, 562 B.R. at 894 (explaining a creditor could only receive prop-
erty that is “worth” the amount of its lien).  This reasoning ignores the reality of
certain situations in which the creditor may receive a windfall. See Whittle Dev.,
Inc. v. Branch Banking Trust Co. (In re Whittle Dev., Inc.), 463 B.R. 796, 802
(N.D. Tex. 2011) (explaining that the policy goals of the Code would be “furthered
if a secured creditor can be prevented from reclaiming property and earning a
windfall at the expense of the estate”).  However, under the dictates of BFP, the
value of the property is determined by the price it can achieve in a forced sale, not
a price for which it may later be sold. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Pulcini (In re
Pulcini), 261 B.R. 836, 844 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining that “a lien creditor who
purchases the property . . . and who then sells the property to a third party for an
amount greater than the amount of its lien is not avoidable in accordance with
§ 547(b) as a preference”).  The court further explained, “In particular, the lien
creditor does not ‘receive more’ for purposes of § 547(b)(5) than it would receive
in a Chapter 7 liquidation.” Id.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
198. See Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre) 562 B.R. 890, 894 (W.D. Pa.
2017) (explaining that because a creditor will receive the amount of its lien, the
creditor could never receive more than it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation).
199. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 548 (explaining that “the only legitimate evidence
of the property’s value at the time it is sold is the foreclosure-sale price itself”).
200. See, e.g., Hackler v. Arianna Holdings Co., LLC (In re Hackler), 571
B.R. 662, 668 (D.N.J. 2017) (holding that the trustee could avoid a pre-petition tax
foreclosure sale where the creditor received a property with an estimated value of
$335,000 in a forced sale in which the creditor paid $40,000).
201. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (defining “pro rata
distribution”).
202. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 1322(a)(3).
203. See supra Section II.A.2.b (explaining the distribution scheme and rules
for unsecured creditors).  Due to the pro rata compensation scheme and rule pro-
viding equal treatment for creditors of the same class, an unsecured creditor who
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3. Hypothetical Examples
Assume a debtor owns a house with a fair market value of
$50,000 and owes two debts:  one debt secured on his house owed
to National Bank for $30,000 and another general unsecured debt
to a mechanic for $15,000.204  If National Bank were to purchase
the house at a forced sale for its lien amount, there would be no
way to avoid the transfer as preferential transfer.205  In this exam-
ple, National Bank received a house with a value of $30,000 at the
forced sale.206  In a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, National
Bank would have received its secured interest—$30,000.207  Be-
cause it received exactly the value of the lien amount, the transfer
could not be subject to avoidance as a preference.208  If, however,
National Bank bid more than its lien amount, the transfer may be
subject to avoidance as a preference.209
In a new scenario, assume a debtor owns a house with a fair
market value of $50,000 and owes two unsecured debts:  one debt of
$30,000 to a car mechanic and one debt of $15,000 to a friend.  In an
unlikely event, assume the friend purchases the debtor’s home in a
forced sale, and the debtor then filed for bankruptcy.  No matter
what the purchase price is, the sale would likely be subject to avoid-
received full payment would receive more than he would under a Chapter 7 unless
all other unsecured creditors were paid an equal amount, which is unlikely given
that the debtors generally file bankruptcy because a lack of assets to satisfy all
debts. See Section II.A.2.b.
204. These scenarios ignore the provision that allows a debtor to exempt a
certain amount of home equity from his bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
205. See supra notes 193–96 and accompanying text (explaining that a se-
cured creditor could not have forced-sale purchase avoided if it pays its lien
amount).
206. Again, this ignores the idea of the property’s fair market value. See
supra notes 134, 148, 191, and 196 and accompanying text (explaining that an as-
set’s fair market value is irrelevant in a forced-sale value analysis).  This situation
would result in avoidance under § 547 only if the court strayed from BFP’s prohi-
bition on using the fair market value. See supra note 187 and accompanying text
(discussing courts that have reinstituted a fair market analysis).  Under such a fair
market analysis, the creditor would have received $50,000, which is more than
$30,000—what it would have received under a hypothetical Chapter 7. See supra
note 200 and accompanying text (explaining a case that looked back to the prop-
erty’s fair market value instead of the price paid at foreclosure).
207. See Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre) 562 B.R. 890, 894 (W.D. Pa.
2017) (explaining that because a creditor will receive the amount of its lien, the
creditor could never receive more than it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation).
208. Id.
209. For example, if National Bank purchased the home for $50,000, it would
have received more than what it would have received under a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion—its lien amount. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (explaining a
scenario where a trustee could avoid a transfer because the creditor received
“more” than it would have under a Chapter 7 distribution).
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ance as a preference.  If the sale were for the amount of debt owed
to the friend, $15,000, the friend would receive more than he would
have under Chapter 7.210  This is due to the Code’s pro rata distri-
bution scheme for unsecured creditors.211  The $15,000 he received
at the sale would had to have been split proportionally, or pro rata,
with each unsecured creditor to comply with distribution rules in a
Chapter 7 liquidation.212  In this case, because there are two credi-
tors, each creditor would receive one half of $15,000 or $7,500.213
Because the friend’s purchase of the home enabled him to receive
$15,000, more than the $7,500 he would have received under a
Chapter 7, this transfer would be subject to avoidance as a prefer-
ential transfer.214
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined pre-BFP cases,215 BFP v. Resolu-
tion Trust Corp.,216 and the resulting circuit split.217  Courts had lit-
tle difficulty applying § 547 to forced sales before the Supreme
Court’s ruling in BFP.218  However, since the BFP decision, courts
have struggled with determining the scope of cases over which the
precedent controls.219
This Comment has examined the cases in which courts have
not extended BFP.220  Courts on this side of the circuit split base
their conclusion on one of two reasons:  § 547 uses different lan-
guage than § 548, and the language in § 547 is clearer than the lan-
guage in § 548.221  These courts have misinterpreted what the BFP
210. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (explaining that, due to pro
rata distribution scheme, a transfer that allows an unsecured creditor to receive full
payment is likely subject to avoidance). See also supra Section II.A.2.b (discussing
treatment of unsecured creditors).
211. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the pro rata distri-
bution scheme).
212. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the pro rata distri-
bution scheme).
213. See supra Section II.A.2.b (discussing treatment of unsecured creditors
and explaining that two creditors of the same class must be treated equally to the
extent the creditor with the smaller claim is not paid in full).
214. See Hackler v. Arianna Holdings Co., LLC (In re Hackler), 571 B.R. 662,
668 (D.N.J. 2017) (holding that the trustee could avoid a pre-petition tax foreclo-
sure sale where the creditor received a property with an estimated value of
$335,000 in a forced sale in which the creditor paid $40,000).
215. See supra Section II.C.
216. See supra Section II.D.
217. See supra Section II.F.
218. See supra Section II.C.
219. See supra Section II.F.
220. See supra Section II.F.
221. See supra Section II.F.
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Court contemplated.222  While the BFP Court’s analysis was in the
context of § 548’s phrase “reasonably equivalent value,” it was truly
an analysis of what the correct standard to judge a “reasonably
equivalent value” is—the “true” value of an asset.223
This Comment then examined courts that have extended BFP
to § 547.224  Even some of these courts have struggled to under-
stand BFP’s reasoning.225  Some courts have extended BFP because
the policy considerations that drove BFP’s conclusion are equally
present in § 547 cases.226  Other courts have extended based on
BFP’s conclusion of how to value property.227  The federalism issue
BFP addressed likely drove the Court’s conclusion.  However, it is
the conclusion that binds lower courts, and BFP stands for the pro-
position that only the forced sale price can evidence an asset’s
value.228
Finally, this Comment endorsed the view that BFP applies to
§ 547 and provided hypothetical examples to illustrate its opera-
tion.229  The Supreme Court’s dictate as to how to value property is
as applicable to § 547 as it is to § 548.  After all, an asset is worth
only what someone has paid for it.
222. See supra Section II.F.
223. See supra Section III.A.
224. See supra Section II.F.
225. See supra Section II.F.
226. See supra Section II.F.
227. See supra Section II.F.
228. See supra Section III.A.1.
229. See supra Section III.A.
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